Abshuct-e of the aims of providing 'security of data' in ecommerce transactions is maldng sure that the receiver receives the same data which the sender sends, that is the data has not been taipered in any way. To achieve this aim digitd signatures are used. A digital signature helps in providing integrity, message authentication, and signer authentication for the signed data. An XML signature can contain or point to the data that is being signed. In this paper we discuss a possible solution of avoiding a signature from breaking when there is B change in the location of the document after it has been signed.
I. INTRODUCTION
As XML is becoming the de facto standard for c o m unication of data over the Internet, the need for security of the data should not be left behind. In fact with out security the whole purpose of achieving data exchange will have no value as there w i l l be no guarantee about the origin and the integrity of the data. Digital security has always been about the compromise between convenience and peace of mind (11. This holds true for XML also. Different approaches have been proposed that address the problem of protecting information in a Web system. However, these approaches typically operate at the file-system level, independently of the data that have to be protected from unauthorized accesses. A lot of study is being done at proving security at the element level [2,3,4].
The two main issues that need to be addressed are:
Restricting the access to an XML service only to authorized users. Maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of the information exchanged.
For this signatures are used. It provides integrity, message authentication, and signer authentication for data that is being included by the signature. A signature helps in keeping the data secure and helps in checking its integriv.
The sender computes a hash value of the data which is to be signed and signs it with hidher private key and includes it in the signature. The receiver authenticates the signature and decrypts the hash value with the sender's public key. It then creates its own hash value of the data and checks it with the hash value that came along with the signature. If they both match then the integrity of the document is assured [5] . If any changes are made to the document after the sender signs the document then the hash value computed at either ends doesn't match and the signature is said io be broken i.e. the integrity of the message is not guaranteed
PROBLEM DEFINITION
An XML signature can contain or point to the data that is being signed and thus it relies on any source available via a URI in the digital signature. But consider a change in the URI location of the data. How will this affect the signature?
We will consider a scenario where the signature that is created points to the data through the Reference URI which has an id "change". Suppose we know that the location where the data is contained is going to change h m htlp://www.chan~e.com/old.xml to h t~: /~. c h a n r r e . c~~n a u . x m l after the signature has been created, but the data signed at the original location is going to remain the same. Then when the signature is being verified, the computed hash value at the receiver's end will not match with the hash value which was sent by the sender due of the change in the URI location and thus the signature might break. Sa our problem is how can we create an XML signature that enables the vaiidity of the signature not to break even in the change of the source location when the document signed is going to remain constant?
In. PROPOSED 
SOLUTION
The signature is a collection of a number of elements according to a schema and each element has its own cardinality. Cardinality specifies the number of occurrence of each element in the signature. An approach to solve the above problem is to utilize such an optional element of the XML Signature, the Manifest element. The use of the Manifest element enables the application to reserve the reference validation semantics for itself [6] .
We w i l l discuss about the Manifest element, the process of Signature generation (core generation) and Signature authentication or validation (core validation), and the steps needed to achieve the solution for the above problem in the next sections. Core generation and core validation process are discussed as it is necessary to know how the signature is created, after the changes are made by using the Manifest element.
IV. THE ~!"FESTELEMENT
The Manifest element is used to provide additional requirements, which are not directly addressed by the basic structure of the X M L signature specification. The Manifest On the contrary the Manifest element too is a collection of Reference elements but it itself is a referenced element. If it is used, then it i s referenced by the Reference subelement of the SignedInfo element. Figure 1 shows a Manifest element "Man" being referenced by the SignedInfo element. For simplicity only the structure of the Signature has been shown and the details are omitted.
When the signature verification takes place, only the integrity of the Reference elements inside SignedInfo element is verified and not of the Reference elements that are inside the Manifest element. But the digest over the Manifest itself will be checked by the core verification process. Thus the validation of the data inside the Manifest element is not done by the Signature verification process but is dependent on the application. We will be utilizing this feature of the Manifest element to propose a solution to the problem mentioned. 
v. CORE GENERATION
Core generation is the process of creating a signature. It consists of two steps, Reference Generation and Signature Generation [7] . Reference Generation aims at creating the Reference element that have all their sub elements like lmnsforms, attributes and digest values. There can be more than one reference element in a signature. The aim of signame generation is to create the Signaturevalue element and complete the whole Signature element with all the attributes and elements. In Sigoature Generation the SignecUnfo element is canonicaiized before it is signed. Canonicalkition ensures that the same octets are signed and compared with which will ensure the signature validity, and it makes sure that semantically meaningless alterations which may happen as the signature is passed through the XML processors of various application doesn't break the signature.
W. CORE VALIDATION
Core validation is the process of checking the validity of the signature. It is an inverse process of core generation. It too is composed of 2 steps, Reference Validation and Signature Validation [7] . Reference validation i s used to check wether the data referenced by the Reference element has not been altered. Signature validation checks the digest value of SignedInfo element with the value stored in Signaturevalue. In order to achieve a solution by using the Manifest element, we have include the data that is going to change its location in the Manifest element and make some changes prior to executing the steps of core generation and core Our aim is to create a transformation which finds the desired URI amiute with the particular id in the Reference sub-element of the Manifest element, and leave it out of the final data before the digest of the message is created i.e. before the steps of core generation are executed. So that the change in the URI location will have no effect during core verification, when the digest over the Manifest element is checked.
Manifest ID="Man'3 The XSLT transform have to be created in such a way so that the <Manifest> element changes from as shown in figure 3 to the one shown in figure 4. Once the transformation is done, the URI is omitted h m being a part of the digest value, The process of core generation is done and the signature is created. Core validation passes as the URI is not included h m being a part of the digest value, and as a result of that the SignatureValue remains the same at both ends and is impervious to changes in the location of the URI. Thus by applying the transformation and omitting the URI. location of the document which is going to change, from being a part of the digest value, we are allowing the document to change its location with out affecting the signature. In the core generation & validation process only the Reference elements that are inside the SignedInfo element are de-referenced, digested and validated, so the internal processing and validation of the Manifest element has to be application specific. The Manifest element enables the application to reserve the reference validation semantics for itself Thus the signature that is created no longer guarantees the location that is contained by the Reference element of the Manifest element and it is the responsibility of the application to verify the validity of that data when the core validation process is being done.
W I . CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we discuss a possible solution of avoiding a signature om breaking when there is a change in the loation of the document. Each URI which anticipates a change in its location must be placed in the <ManifesP element which enables the application to reserve the reference validation semantics for itself. We utilize this element to contain the data whose location is going to change and apply an XSLT transform to omit the URI attribute.
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Privacy and Security Shield for Health Information Systems (e-Health)
I. INTRODUCTION In Health Care, there are many enterphe-oriented applications that have been used within a closed "circle-ofcare''. It has been widely recoguized that an integration of these applications into a network-centric h e w o r k would likely result in significant service improvements and cost
A major challenge in this context is to develop scalable, secure web based services where the security and privacy M e w o r k is meant for the access to and the protection of sensitive information as it travels across the boundaries of individual organisations, in compliance with the Privacy of Information Act [3]. In this regard, e-heaIth is one of the major blocks of the Secure Channel of the Canadian eGovernment fiamework [4].
The backbone of our work is the secure web-data manipulation by medical specialists, while deaIing with patients affected by diseases calling for a highly specialized knowledge and expextise. In this context a platform able to interact with a plethora of databases and other forms of information storage and retrieval methods is a must. The interaction of doctors with the information has to be secured through encryption and through a complex process of authentication and authorization. Some of the required security technologies have already been developed for other industries, e.g., in the area of electronic commerce.
Other technologies such as patient-consent dependent role-based access control and person-oriented audit trails are not ready available to date.
11. SYSTEM hCI3ITECCUR.E Figure 1 illustrates the system components, which will be described in the sequel. The AAM uses the Certificate manager (CM) and the Individual Consent Manager (ICM) to control access to information content based on personal consent, the role of the information-accessing entity, and the type of information use, The DMMP component is the ceria control system of the data and metadata exploration, migration, unification, and management. It is meant to unify different data from different types from different databases used by different medical units, classifying them, storing the unified data in a database and allowing clients to retrieve the information with different degrees of flexibility. The platform is intrinsically providing the security inhstructure related to the management of authority certificates, the authentication and the encryption of data using standardized encryption algorithms.
B. Decision Support System PSS)
The DSS consists of two parts:
The diagnostic Sub-system offers a primary use of personal health information for offering consultation while the Knowledge sub-system offers a secondary use of health information for training. The DSS is an excellmt case study for analyzing and developing distributed security and privacy mechanisms that match a patient's given consent to the type of infomation use. Results will be applicable to a broad range of applications in health care.
For more details on the DSS, which is built as a dynamic service environment, using holonic multi-agent technology,
The PPR is a directory service that contains information about patients and health care providers, such as their identification number, certification, domain expertise etc. The PPR is currently being developed in other projects fhded by regional health authorities and the Canada Health Infoway.
D. Individual Consent Manager @CM
The ICM maintains and serves information about the consent given by individuals about the use of their personal health information. In addition to a Web service interface to be used by other M e w o r k components, it has a secure Web interface to enable individuaIs to review and adjust consent information.
E. Certificale Manager (Cw
The CM distributes and controls (potentially revokes) digitally signed trust certificates (X.509) of providers and patients. Trust certificates are essential for establishing authenticity as well as providing a basis for encryption based on a public key infiastructure (PIU). For DMMP see
II1.A.

F. Secure Health Informution Access Lqer (SHIAL)
The main purpose of this component is to leverage the value of existing heterogeneous medical applications and integrate them into a networked EHRs.
The SHIAL has to resolve heterogeneity on two levels, namely on the technological leveI and on the semantic level. From a technological point of View the HIAL provides a standardized way of accessing heterogeneous syst e m using Web service technology (SOAP, XML, and UDDI etc.).
From a semantic point of view, HIAL provides a conceptual mapping of data structures and terminologies used in the various heterogeneous medical systems to a standard ontology, based on the HL7 Reference Information Model
In terms of security, SHIAL mediates between trust credentials on the inter-organizational network level and those trust credentials used within the enterprise. From an interorganizational view, SHIAL security is based on functionality provided by AAM. Since the semantic mapping to RIM provides S W with knowledge about the semantics of information accessed by network services, SHIAL can provide AAM with meta-data important for deciding whether to grant access for a particular use case.
0-G. Audit Trail Manager (ATW
The ATM manages person-oriented audit trails for personal health information exchanged in the EH& network.
Most currently available audit mechanisms are resourcebased, rather than person-based. They log access operations to specific information resources such as data files, database tables, network objects etc.
In a network-centric architecture integrating many heterogeneous data sources, these mechanisms are too limited to provide answers to person-oriented auditing questions, such as "Who has accessed what information about me and for what purpose?" Person-oriented audit-trails are difficult to achieve in heterogeneous environments because information content is structured in different ways, and, thus, it becomes problematic to distinguish anonymous information content fiom personal information. In our framework, this semantic heterogeneity problem is solved by the SHIAL, which maps heterogeneous concepts used at different organizations to a common RIM.
Consequently, the SKtAL will use the ATM to log all access to personal information on the network. In addition to logging these access patterns, the ATM has a role of resolving synonymous ways of identifymg individuals (such as by name, by Personal Health Number -PHN etc.)
H. EHR Media Knowledge Base (MKB)
The availability of high bandwidth networks (such, as CA*Net4 [6] enable the use of multimedia and real-time collaborative web-services for pattem recopition in diagnostic images.
We extend the concept of a knowledge base with textual data to include diagnostic images and the expert system (part of the DSS) will be extended to offer consultation on graphical images, generated by the medical machines. The MKl3 is based on off-the-shelf components. Diagnostic Imaging repositories are currently being developed in projects funded by Infoway and health authorities.
I. CIinicul EHR System (C-EHR)
The C-EHR component in our EHRs stands for potentially many different clinical information systems in Vision Care to be integrated in the network-centric h e w o r k .
For the purpose of this project, we use VFUS (Vision Rehabilitation Information System), an in-kind contribution made by Jackson Willms Medical Services Inc.
LII. DATA MINING, MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT PLATFORM @m) FOR E-HEALTH PRIVACY E"CEMENT
A. Overview
The DMMP (Fig. 2) , [7] is seen as the control layer of the entire system. The key problems to be addressed by the DMMP are related to the general architecture of the data indexing for unifying diverse data from different doctor's files about the patient history and diagnostic made as well as the data exploration, synchronization and reporting.
These issues are to be investigated in the context of the SHIAL architecture. The mapping between SHlAL and DMMF has to be devised and implemented as the SHIAL is providing functions for the domain data understanding while the DMMP is providing the connection between data stored in data bases, file systems, emails, web-servers, and in general any form of data storing and manipulation. & simple defdtion and adjustment of qualifying processes using an iconic p m g " i n g Ianw g e ; the central control of DMMP-manager components; provision for automated categorization of information; the optimization of system's performance
The DMMP-manager is based on the DMMP -fider.
The D W -f m d e r allows DMMP-manager to understand information, thus adding a quality dimension never seen before in information retrieval systems. DMMP -manager ensures central access to a host of different data sources.
With the help of an intelligent agent system (Fig. 2) [SI, any changes can be identified and conveyed to the central system. This means, users are kept up to speed with the latest information at all times. The DMMP is compatible with portals and other systems. This degree of interconnectivity enables it to deliver qualified information ftotn one or more data sources to any users or systems within the loop. DMMP is transparent to the hardware and the operating system used.
The DMMP has a layered architecture (Fig. 3) . Functionality in the lower layers is used by the upper layers, while the user interacts with the highest level layers. Processing Layer. Coordinates the data collecting, processing and distribution operations. Data is processed through processing scripts, this layer handles data translation, mapping and structuring. Control Layer. Responsible with the DMMF modules administration. Provides a complete management system for data management h e w o r k components, components can be remotely installed, configured and managed.
B. The Security L q e r DMMP access is granted o d y to authorized users, which can enter the platform only through the DMMP Security Layer (Fig. 4) . Based on the user credentials, the security layer determines the user roles and permissions, and the data that can be available for the user. The key security concept that lay the foundation of the DMMP functionality are: Authorization Tickets. The authorization ticket represents the information used to securely identify the session with the client. Based on the authorization ticket that has been obtained as a result of the login operation, the client identifies its session using this authorization ticket. The authorization ticket carries information related to the user session and it is signed with the security module's secret key in order to avoid malicious usage. The authorization ticket has a very short validity period (some minutes) calculated fiom the last usage time of the ticket.
Security Session. Once the client authenticates himself to the system a security session is created for him on the security module server side. Each security session has associated an authorization ticket, which is passed to the client.
The authorization ticket is the identifier of the session. The forming an operation or accessing a resource. security session maintains the security connection context for the user that has been authenticated in the system. User Securiw Context. Every time a user logs in, a user security context is created (if it was not created before -a user may login in the system more rimes through different modules). There is a connection between the user security context and the authorization ticket. The user security context maintains secure infomation related to the user (user credentials, user principal, etc.). Authentication Ticket. The authentication ticket represents a substitute for the credentials that the users must provide to authenticate themselves to the system.
Heartbeat. When the authorization ticket is not used in some security operation for a longer period of time, the client may loose the session. In order to avoid this situation, the client may send heartbeat signals to the security layer, maintaining the session alive. "he two previously mentioned key problems to be addressed in the SHL4L (Fig. 5) , namely resolution of technological and respectively semantic heterogeneity, are addressed on two separate layers in the conceptual SHIAL architecture. The first problem is addressed in the Platform Homogenization Layer, which hosts an extensible plug-in architecture of so-called ImpEx Conduits (import/export adapters). Each such conduit interfaces to a different type of physical data repository and provides a canonical, XMLbased data access layer to be used by the next SHIAL architectuml level, the Semantic Homogenization Layer 
v. AUTEIORIZAT~ON AND ACCESS M A C E R (AAM) AND
N I V l D U A L CONSENT MANAGER UCM)
The A A M ' s main function is to answer the question "Dots prospective user X have the right to perform function Y on data set 2." X might be an individual or a system. Y might be, for example, display, print, copy, email, or import into a clinical system. 2 is often characterized as being about a person and of a particular information type. The ICM's main purpose is to provide the systematic capability for individuals to author and record their preferences (policies, rules) for the dissemination and use of their private health information (medical patient records), and then to serve that information to the AAM. The two components work together to effect individual privacy preferences in practice at the point of use of patient health records. They must be able to handle cases where the records are in a structured database or in document form (a humanreadable file such as a word processor file) independent of any identified database or document repository. C A " recently supported the Policy and Peer Permission (PPP) system project invoIving RightsMarket:
(http://m.rightsmarket.com), University of Calgary Telehealth (http://www.fp.ucalgary.cdtelehealtW), and the Ottawa Heart Institute. The AAM to a large extent, and ICM to a significant extent, are derived from the deliverables of that successful project and integrated w i t h the DMMP component.
VI. APPLICATIONS
The project is focused on a specific EHR solution, in the context of a decision support system (DSS) for Glaucoma Progression Monitoring, Fig. 6 [IO]. The application domain is the area of health science applications, namely the research of using web-services in assisting doctors for the investigation of the progression process along a patient's lifetime in the case o f glaucoma monitoring and treatment. The DSS will support the doctors in the diagnostic, treatment and supervision processes of the evolution of a glaucoma patient based on the exploration of all data pertinent to the case and on the scientific data contained in various professional databases [12]. The DSS consists of an EducationtConsultation System [l 11 to provide evidencebased guidelines of care to clinicians, and a Consensus Analyzer [13] to constantly update and refine these guidelines based on patient encounters and expert opinions. Users can access the DSS directly via a Web-based user interface, or indirectly by using their clinical EHR system, which integrates w i t h the DSS. The DSS is also integrated with other EHR hfiastructure services, such a s patient and provider registries. In addition to structured data, the Glaucoma monitoring system uses high-resolution diagnostic imaging supported by CA*net 4, ORION, NETERAnet etc. The medical specialist interacts in real-time with the various data collected, unified, and explored through the DMMP and provided to the DSS components. With respect to the HL7 e-Health communication standard, we are working on the creation of ao R-MIM for Glaucoma diagnosis and guidelines, based on our previous work on the development of e-Health ontologies [SI.
W. CONCLUSIONS
(1) a reference model for secure web-sewices as a refmement of Infoway's EHR Blueprint with respect to aspects of security, (2) specification and design of an integrated environment and tools for supporting the activity of the medical specialist while curing patients with glaucoma (3) implementation of these components and their integration w i t h components developed by other EHR initiatives (e.g., patient and provider registry), and (4) their evaluation with a specific net-centric pilot application: glaucoma progression monitoring.
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